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I.
“Religious freedom” -- there is a lot of talk about it in the United States today.

Almost everyone wants to be on the side of it, of course, but a moment’s reflection

reveals that neither term, “religious” or “freedom,” let alone the phrase, is univocal.
The dominant discourse is as ambiguous as it is plentiful. Any potentially

promising analysis of claims on behalf of “religious freedom” must start, therefore,
by disambiguating the terms and clarifying meanings. Only then can we begin to

establish any normative case for “religious freedom” and for the metes and bounds

of its legal protection. Only then, moreover, can we make way for something we hear
entirely too little about, the freedom of the Church, libertas Ecclesiae -- indeed, more
to the point I intend to address, for the rights of the Church herself, the mystical
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body of Christ. The right of Christ’s mystical body precedes, surpasses, and, in fact
justifies any possible “right” to “religious freedom,” or so I shall contend. 2

It is a familiar fact that much of the recent rhetorical flourish in favor of

“religious freedom” has come from defensive Catholics contending that they are

under attack by their own national government. This is the stuff of New York Times
headlines and nightly news. It is the stuff, more specifically, of unprecedented

regulation by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that would

require the Catholic Church, among others, to purchase and provide her workers
with contraception, sterilization, and abortifacients. It is, in turn, the stuff of

denunciatory statements by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and a

number of local Ordinaries, of paeans to “our most basic freedom” by the Bishops, of
not-quite-responsive equivocations and entrenchment on the part of the White

House, of the filing of litigation briefs and responses, of “fortnights for freedom,”
and so on and on and on.

Lost in the familiar, dulling, and even debasing wash-rinse-repeat is the sheer

perversity of the fact that Catholics are now asked to believe that it counts as a good
day when Catholics (and others) succeed in convincing legislators, judges, or other

Advocates of “religious freedom” gain social traction from the illusion that a
regime that ostensibly respects “religious freedom” can avoid prickly and divisive
questions concerning the truth of claims made in the name of religion. As Paul
Horwitz observes, however, “[t]here is simply no escaping the question of religious
truth.” Paul Horwitz, The Agnostic State: Law, Religion, and the Constitution (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 160. The liberalism with which we are
saturated is tolerant of religion only within the bounds allowed by liberalism itself,
not beyond, which is why, as Kenneth Craycraft concludes, “[t]here is no such thing
as religious freedom, and the reason that such an assertion sounds so shocking is
that we have been completely formed by the American myth.” Kenneth R. Craycraft,
Jr., The American Myth of Religious Freedom (Dallas: Spence Publishing Co., 1999),
164.
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government officials to make an exception to laws of general applicability on their

behalf. Is it really enough for Catholics to be able to keep the faith thanks only to

“accommodation?” And, to put a different question, one that almost no one seems to
care to ask: what about the fate of the non-Catholics who lead their lives according

to the law to which the Catholics have won an exception? The status quo is fraught
with legally sanctioned or required conduct that is immoral. It is concessum that

many or even most if those committing that conduct do not recognize its

immorality, but, whatever else Catholics are, they are not moral relativists. The
moral law was promulgated universally, not parochially.

The particular matter at hand, the HHS contraceptive mandate, remains a

work in progress or, more likely, as only time will tell, in regress. Some Catholic
bishops have stated that they will close Catholic hospitals, schools, orphanages,
social service providers, and the like, rather than comply with a government

command that violates the moral law as taught by the Church. For purposes of the
present analysis, I will simply stipulate, rather than argue, a point that some

dispute: despite some cosmetic and accounting changes introduced into the final

rule adopted by the HHS after an epic administrative rulemaking process, the rule
still requires Catholic associations – that is, the pluriform social organs of the

Church – to act in such a way as to violate certain absolute moral norms. On that
stipulation, the situation is grave, the future ominous, for the Church.

Some Catholics and others express shock at the government’s action and,

moreover, at many people’s approval of and enthusiasm for it. For my part, though,

none of this comes as much of a surprise, and the reasons for my lack of surprise are
3

a large part of what I wish to explore here. The problem is that most of the

conversation misses the (one) truly important point.

Before digging down into the weeds, however, I would like to begin by

highlighting and juxtaposing two Catholic doctrines -- the first because opponents

are wont to ignore, downplay, or distort it, the second because it is, I will argue, the

too-little-appreciated way out of the cul-de-sac that is “religious liberty.” It is a
destructive compulsion to try to describe as or convert all good things into

“liberties,” and my principal thesis here is that, whatever the case about “religious
liberty” or “religious freedom” (I use the two terms interchangeably throughout),

Catholics -- and others, of course -- are first called to make way for the Church. 3 In a

world simultaneously organized and disorganized according to the tenets of

liberalism and individualism, there is no more urgent task for Catholics than to

recover the implications of the Church’s being a perfect society, of honoring the
rights of the mystical body of Christ, that is, of Christ-continued-in-the-world.

II.
The first doctrine to be highlighted is that coercion must never be used to

force the unbaptized to “believe” what Christians believe or to “do” what Christians
do. The Catholic Church is unequivocally and unalterably opposed to compelling
Some distinguished scholars just plain drain the religion right out of “religious
liberty” by reducing it to liberty simpliciter. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, “Religious
Liberty as Liberty,” 7 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 313 (1996).
3
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people to enter the Church. In the words of Second Vatican Council’s Declaration on
Religious Liberty, Dignitatis Humanae: “It is one of the major tenets of Catholic

doctrine that man's response to God in faith must be free: no one therefore is to be

forced to embrace the Christian faith against his own will. This doctrine is contained
in the word of God and it was constantly proclaimed by the Fathers of the Church.

The act of faith is of its very nature a free act.” 4 In this the Council reiterates an
enduring theological truth of high importance, even if we must admit that well-

meaning souls acting in the name of the Church have sometimes zealously violated
it.

Second, while incorporation into the Church must be voluntary,

incorporation into the Church is, in fact, the one thing that ultimately matters. As we
read in paragraph 760 of the Catechism of the Catholic Church:

Christians of the first centuries said, "The world was created for the sake

of the Church.” [Pastor Hermae, Vision 2, 4, 1: PG 2, 899; cf. Aristides, Apol.
16, 6; St Justine, Apol. 2, 7: PG 6, 456; Tertullian, Apol. 31, 3; 32, 1: PL 1,
508-509.] God created the world for the sake of communion with his

divine life, a communion brought about by the "convocation" of men in

Christ, and this "convocation" is the Church. The Church is the goal of all
things, [Cf. St. Epiphanius, Panarion 1, 1, 5: PG 41, 181C.] and God

permitted such painful upheavals as the angels' fall and man's sin only as
Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Declaration on Religious Liberty, Dignitatis
Humanae No. 10 (1965) (citations omitted). Unless otherwise noted, all translations
of Vatican documents are from the versions found on the Holy See’s website.
4
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occasions and means for displaying all the power of his arm and the whole
measure of the love he wanted to give the world:

Just as God's will is creation and is called "the world," so his intention
is the salvation of men, and it is called "the Church.” [Clement of
Alexandria, Paed. 1, 6, 27: PG 8, 281.]

Creation was for the sake of the Church, and the Church is the mystical body of

Christ. In the words of Henri Cardinal De Lubac: “If Christ is the sacrament of God,
the Church is for us the sacrament of Christ; she represents him, in the full and

ancient meaning of the term; she really makes him present. She not only carries on
his work, but she is his very continuation . . . .” 5 The head of the Mystical Body is

Christ Himself, the King of the Universe, whose antecedent will is that all be saved

by incorporation into His mystical body. 6 The way out of the cul-de-sac of “religious
liberty” is Christ-continued-in-the-world.

This truth has, and should have, literally cosmic consequences -- an

eventuality that its indefatigable opponents are ever poised to defeat. These

opponents’ strategies for inflicting defeat include both individual manoeuvres and,
moreover, systemic orderings, including at the level of constitutional law. It is too

Henri De Lubac, Catholicism: Christ and the Common Destiny of Man 76 (San
Francisco: Ignatius Press,1988). Trans. Lancelot C. Sheppard and Sister Elizabeth
Englund, O.C.D. Original ed. 1947.
6 On the theology of the mystical body of Christ, see Emile Mersch S.J., The Whole
Christ: The Historical Development of the Doctrine of the Mystical Body in Scripture
and Tradition (Eugene, Oregon: WIPF & Stock, 2011), espec. 556-73. Trans. John R.
Kelly, S.J. Original ed. 1938.
5
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little noticed that the United States’ juridical order has the effect, if not also the

purpose, of hobbling – indeed, eliding -- the Church. What the enthusiasts of our

First Amendment’s so-called “religion clauses” must answer for is that that “article

of peace,” as it is sometimes called with approbation, does not so much as recognize,
as a matter of constitutional law, the Church per se. To be sure, individuals enjoy

constitutional rights to the “free exercise of religion,” but the Constitution does not
cognize the Church as such as a rights-bearing reality. What room to operate the

Church is afforded as a matter of constitutional law is of a piece with what liberty the

Boy Scouts enjoy, that is, the (contingent) right of any old group to associate. 7 And,

furthermore, what liberty the Church enjoys as a matter of sub-constitutional law is,
as a practical matter, a function of the largely unprincipled contingencies of our tax

code and, specifically, what the Internal Revenue Service determines will “count” as
a 501c(3) entity under Section 26 of the United States Code.

This situation seems not to trouble many contemporary Catholics, who are

functionally Congregationalists. To the extent they give the matter any thought at

all, they are contented by the Constitution’s agnosticism concerning the Church, in
part because they habitually think of the Church on the model of a club or some

other mere voluntary association, not as a perfect society, indeed, the very purpose

of creation itself. Having read (or at least imbibed) their Locke, who would tolerate

everyone except “Papists and fanatics,” 8 they are just grateful to be tolerated and

Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (“expressive association”). See
Richard Garnett, “Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy
Scouts?,” 22 St. John’s Journal of Legal Commentary (2007).
8 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (Hackett Publishing Co, 1983), 17. Ed.
James H. Tully.
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accommodated. Indeed, they are deaf and blind to the perversity in their being

obliged (and obligated) to say “pretty please” when they are emboldened to petition

the government officials, whose salaries they pay, merely to accommodate their

ways of living qua Church. And, my further point is that they are oblivious to how

their accommodation-strategy amounts to collusion in arranging a social and legal
order out of conformity with the moral law. Under the influence of the godless

premises that underlie the Constitution itself, they have given up trying to correct
and transform the world to reflect the reality of the Church and what she teaches.
Lobbyists for the status quo are around every corner and at every bus stop, and

many Catholics – the ones who are always saying that the Church should “stay out of
politics” and should “let people decide for themselves” – are among the greatest

lovers of the way things are. Catholics should know better than to leave this world

to own pathetic devices. Catholics must reject the normativity of the status quo and
refuse to grovel before the Zeitgeist.

The Catholic position on which I proceed is this: law must be on the side of

reality, and not just, except as a last resort, by way of the regulatory largesse called

“accommodation.” The reality is that salvation history is not a tragedy, even if some
would like us to ignore Christ’s victory and embrace as humanity’s best-hope a

tragic mode of living. 9 Catholic theology teaches that creation was for the sake for

the Church, and Catholic theology also teaches that the “aim” of the Church “is the
realization of the kingdom of God not only within its own organization but in the
E.g., Marc DeGirolami, The Tragedy of Religious Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2013).
9
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whole of human society and not only in the after life but also in this life.” 10 This

realization can occur, as Bernard Longeran further explains, “only when theology
unites itself with all other relevant branches of human studies.” 11 Theology must

teach law and shape law, else law will impede nothing short of the very purpose of
creation. Unless the juridical order is structured by the Church’s own self-

understanding, it cannot but thwart the reason for its own – and all of creation’s -existence. The foundational point is that the divinely given constitution of the
Church must shape the contingent constitution of the state, not the other way
around.

But how? Not by merely protecting “religious freedom.” In the terms in

which it is much advocated today, “religious freedom” involves a defeating and even

deadly distraction from the very purpose of creation itself, the Church. 12 The

Church first, only then the issues revolving around toleration of the practice of false
religions and so forth.

I am not naïve. We cannot anticipate that our culture will soon comprehend,

let alone honor, claims on behalf of the Church. The transcendent point, however, is
that it would be a false denial of human freedom itself to treat the destruction and
declension that individual and collective human agency began five-hundred years

ago, and later entrenched in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as

Bernard J.F. Lonergan, Method in Theology (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1979),
363-64. Original edition 1972.
11 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 364
12 A partly complementary account is Steven Smith, “Freedom of Religion or
Freedom of the Church?”, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1911412
10
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inevitable or irreversible. 13 We cannot give up fighting. We need not be impotent

because our forebears failed. We need not self-fulfill the false prophecy of historical
tragedy. Instead, we need to make exactly the arguments that the agents of the

grand coalition in favor of the status quo tell us not to bother making. 14 And we

need, moreover, to use not just reasoned arguments but also the very tool that those
same agents are keenest to marginalize: the grace of the supernatural. The

advertisement of the prospect of a completely natural “solution” to our human
situation popularizes a pernicious Enlightenment myth that is destined to
disappoint.

In order to resist the ubiquitous heresy that the Popes have condemned

under the name “naturalism,” we Catholics must insist on what Cardinal Pie of

Poitiers recognized as the “primacy of the supernatural.” 15 Also in the words of
For the history, see Brad S. Gregory, The Unintended Reformation: How a
Religious Revolution Secularized Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2012).
14 I owe the “grand coalition for the status quo” expression to John Rao. See his
Black Legends and the Light of the World: The War of Words with the Incarnate Word
(Forest Lake, MN: Remnant Press, 2011).
15 Quoted in Joseph F.X. Sladky, “Cardinal Pie and the Social Kingship of Christ,”
Crisis Magazine, May 16, 2013. Almost none of Cardinal Pie’s many writings has
been translated from French into English, but there is a pamphlet, “Selected
Writings of Cardinal Pie of Poitiers” (Catholic Action Resource Center, 2007), that
contains key passages. On the error and heresy of naturalism, see Pope Leo XIII,
encyclical letter Humanum Genus (1884) No. 12: “Now, the fundamental doctrine of
the naturalists, which they sufficiently make known by their very name, is that
human nature and human reason ought in all things to be mistress and guide. Laying
this down, they care little for duties to God, or pervert them by erroneous and vague
opinions. For they deny that anything has been taught by God; they allow no dogma
of religion or truth which cannot be understood by the human intelligence, nor any
teacher who ought to be believed by reason of his authority. And since it is the
special and exclusive duty of the Catholic Church fully to set forth in words truths
divinely received, to teach, besides other divine helps to salvation, the authority of
13
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Cardinal Pie: “Jesus Christ is not optional,” 16 and because His mystical body is the

Church, the Church is not optional. It comes down to this: if we believe that creation
itself was for the sake of the Church, we can hardly make “religious freedom” the

ideal. We may well need to tolerate, for now, it as the best available modus vivendi,
but it would be apostasy to renounce the ideal: the reign of Christ over all and the
incorporation of all into his mystical body. Christ came to bring salvation, not

endless toleration.

III.
Working from the judgment that law must be shaped by correct theology

(which is by no means to claim that law must necessarily prohibit all moral vices),

we can take as our proximate theological starting point Dignitatis humanae. One of

the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council’s most important documents, it was

promulgated, under the authority of Pope Paul VI, following a vote of the Council

Fathers, 2,308 in favor and 70 opposed, thus receiving more Non placet votes than

any other Council document. Dignitatis’s main theme, the right of the human person
to “religious freedom” – that is, roughly, of his liberty to practice his chosen religion

-- hardly requires further introduction, even as the term awaits the specification and
delimitation that will be provided in Section VI. The Declaration’s sonorous phrases

its office, and to defend the same with perfect purity, it is against the Church that the
rage and attack of the enemies are principally directed.”
16 Quoted in Sladky, “Cardinal Pie and the Social Kingship of Christ.”
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in praise of religious freedom or “liberty of conscience” -- so long as the “public

order” is preserved -- have been almost universally celebrated ever since they were
declared, even as the meaning of “public order” has been debated and, as we shall

see, authoritatively clarified and corrected.

Dignitatis’s declaration of the right to “religious freedom” delivered nothing

short of a shocking surprise. Prior to the Council, there was among Catholic

theologians what Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., has fairly described as “unanimity”

against the possibility of such a thing. “[The theologians] were united,” Noonan

explains, “because they followed what [Pope] Gregory XVI had taught in Mirari vos,

what Pius IX, following Gregory XVI, had taught in Quanta cura, what Leo XIII in the
wake of his predecessors had proclaimed in Immortale Dei.” 17 What Gregory had

declared that had been followed is this in nucleo: “From [the] most foul fruit of

indifferentism flows that absurd and erroneous opinion, or, rather, madness, that

freedom of conscience must be affirmed for everyone.” 18 “Deliramentum,” madness,
is what Gregory XVI and, echoing him, Pius IX judged liberty of conscience to be. 19
The attention devoted since 1965 to what Dignitatis declared on behalf of

what recent Popes had only recently regarded as nothing short of insanity or

madness is, I think, no less than is merited. It has, however, tended to occlude the

most important element of the interpretive context in which Dignitatis declared it.

John T. Noonan, Jr., The Lustre of Our Country: The American Experience of
Religious Freedom (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 27.
18 Pope Gregory XVI, encyclical letter Mirari vos (1832) No. 14, quoted in Noonan,
The Lustre of Our Country, 27.
19 Noonan, The Lustre of Our Country, 360. “Deliramentum, meaning ‘madness,’ is
the term used by both Gregory XVI and Pius IX. It is sometimes softened by being
translated ‘aberration’; but ‘madness’ is what Gregory XVI chose to call liberty of
conscience; and Pius IX repeated the term.” Ibid.
17
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The rarely discussed Section 1 of Dignitatis undertakes, in terms, authoritatively to
establish what the Declaration on Religious Liberty is about and, correlatively, what
it is not about. Section 1 reads in relevant part as follows: “Religious freedom, . . .

which men demand as necessary to fulfill their duty to worship God, has to do with
immunity from coercion in civil society. Therefore it leaves untouched [integram

relinquit] traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men and societies toward
the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ.” 20 By its own explicit

declaration, then, the Dignitatis emphatically refuses to attempt a fresh statement

concerning the relationship between Church and state. The Declaration does not
attempt to develop doctrine on this issue; it specifically reaffirms “traditional”
Catholic doctrine on the duties of men “and societies” – political society not

exempted -- toward the Church. Any reasonable doubt about this is eliminated
when one recalls that those two words – “traditional” and “societies” – were

adopted late in the drafting process because alternative formulations received too

few votes. 21 The key section of the Relatio by Bishop DeSmedt makes clear that the

changes worked by those two words were intended to reaffirm, in particular, the
moral duty of the state to recognize the unique truth of the Catholic religion. 22

Emphasis added.
The relevant portion of the immediately preceding Textus recognitus stated:
“Moreover this treatment of religious liberty leaves intact the Catholic doctrine
concerning the one true religion, the one Church of Christ, and the moral duty of
men towards the Church.” As Michael Davies explains, “[t]his compromise did not
work, and the vote indicated that 28% of the Fathers were still partly or wholly
unsatisfied – a minority too large to be ignored. . . . The final text . . . is definitely
much stronger due to the addition of the words traditional and societies.” Michael
Davies, The Second Vatican Council and Religious Liberty (Long Prairie, MN:
Neumann Press, 1992), 171.
22 Davies, The Second Vatican Council and Religious Liberty, 171.
20
21
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This language of Section 1 reaffirming the “traditional Catholic doctrine”

provides, in turn, the context in which to interpret the following important passage
in Dignitatis Section 6:

If, in view of peculiar circumstances obtaining among certain peoples, special
legal recognition is given in the constitutional order of society to one

religious body, it is at the same time imperative that the right of all citizens
and religious bodies to religious freedom should be recognized and made
effective in practice. 23

Some have argued that this conspicuously circumscribed, or even tortured,

acknowledgment of the legitimacy of what in English we refer to as “establishment”

of religion should be read as creating an authoritative exception to the “traditional

Catholic doctrine” affirmed in Sec. 1 and said there to be left “untouched,” according
to which establishment of the Catholic religion was the norm, indeed the ideal, in a

Catholic society. In other words, some claim that Sec. 6 works a renunciation of the
Church’s traditional claim to a right, in a Catholic society, to be the religion of the
state.

Worthy of special note, on this question of the effect of Sec. 6, is what Father

Joseph Ratzinger wrote in 1966 in his book Theological Highlights of Vatican II:

As translated in Walter M. Abbott, S.J. (ed), The Documents of Vatican II in a New
and Definitive Translation (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 685.
23
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Most controversial was the third newly emphasized aspect. The text

attempts to emphasize a continuity in the statements of the official Church on
this issue. It also says that it “leaves intact the traditional Catholic doctrine

on the moral duty of men and communities toward the one true religion and
the only Church of Christ.” The term “duty” here has doubtful application to

communities in their relation to the Church. Later on in the Declaration, the
text itself corrects and modifies these earlier statements, offering something

new, something that is quite different from what is found, for example, in the
statements of Pius XI and Pius XII. It would have been better to omit these
compromising formulas or to reform them with the latter text. The

introduction (Article 1) changes nothing in the text’s content; therefore, we
need not regard it as anything more than a minor flaw. 24

The brilliant young priest who would later reign as Pope Benedict XVI was present

at the Council and active there as a peritus, so it is surprising for him to judge

mistakenly that the text of Sec. 1 that was added at the last minute was “corrected”

by the preexisting language of Sec. 6. In any event, in 1989 then-Cardinal Ratzinger

stated that he no longer held the view that Sec. 6 of the enacted text “corrects” Sec.
1. 25

Ratzinger’s change of mind was all to the good, I would suggest, but it hardly

resolves the decisive issue. That issue, of course, is the meaning of the text

Joseph Ratzinger, Theological Highlights of Vatican II (New York: Paulist Press,
2009), 211-12. (emphasis supplied). Original edition 1966.
25 Davies, The Second Vatican Council and Religious Liberty, 205.
24
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identified by a correct interpretation. But what, then, is the meaning of Dignitatis on
this question? Commenting on Sec. 1, Russell Hittinger has observed that “[i]t might
prove surprising, if not frustrating, that [Dignitatis] puts to one side theoretical
treatment of the issues that directly touch, in American terms, upon the

establishment of religion. . . . A reader might reasonably say,” Hittinger continues:
[a]fter all these centuries of church and society constituting a kind of corpus
mysticum, and after all the various and sundry establishments of religion, it

hardly seems possible that the “official” reckoning with this history would be
reduced to the disclaimer in Sec. 1, regarding what the Council leaves

untouched, and the rather terse sentence of Sec. 6 on the need for the state to
respect the rights of minorities in situations where the Church is privileged
in the constitution. The correct response is that it is not possible because
[Dignitatis] does not undertake such a reckoning. For the Second Vatican
Council it was quite enough to tackle the problem of the religious civil
liberties of individuals, communities, and the Church Herself. 26

I agree with Hittinger that the best available interpretation of the text must

acknowledge that by its own terms Dignitatis unequivocally leaves “untouched” or
“intact” (“integram relinquit”) the traditional Catholic doctrine on, among related

topics, civil society’s – or the state’s -- duty toward the Church. One may regret this,

and one may even note, correctly, that so-called “traditionalists” called for the Sec. 1
Russell Hittinger, The First Grace: Rediscovering the Natural Law in a PostChristian World (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2003), 224-25.
26
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explicit concession regarding what the Declaration did not do. An honest and docile
reading of the document, however, must reflect what it acknowledges as its

intended silences. “The beginning of wisdom in reading [Dignitatis] is to respect its
silences,” 27 as Hittinger has observed. I will return to this below.

Before proceeding, however, one final cautionary comment on the current

state of the hermeneutics of Dignitatis is in order. The document is, in my view,

ambiguous, at least in some respects (though not in others) on the pivotal questions

under discussion here, and intentionally so. In fact, on the very pages of

L’Osservatore Romano, Walter Cardinal Kasper, emphatically not a traditionalist,
recently insisted up as much, including that the ambiguities were part of an

intentional program, what Michael Davies had earlier referred to as “time bombs.” 28

More recently still, Bishop Athanasius Schneider of Kazakhstan has called for an

authoritative clarification of the documents of Vatican II by the Holy See, and I

applaud his call, recognizing, with all due respect, that Pope Francis is an unlikely

source for the much-needed theological precision. 29 In any event, until such time as
the ambiguities are removed, they will continue to wreak havoc in the life of the

Church, inevitably generating conflict on issues on which there should be Catholic
unity. Meanwhile, for the reasons I have already adduced, I consider the sounder

interpretation of Dignitatis to be that it leaves traditional doctrine untouched on the

duties of societies toward the true religion and the one Church of Christ, while at the
Hittinger, First Grace, 238.
http://unamsanctamcatholicam.blogspot.com/2013/04/kasper-admitsintentional-ambiguity.html.
29 http://unamsanctamcatholicam.blogspot.com/2013/07/athanasius-schneiderclarification-of.html
27
28

17

same tracing out perhaps necessary prudential considerations for the peculiarly

modern and unfortunate social circumstances in which Catholics are in a minority. 30

IV.

Among those who sometimes refused to acknowledge Dignitatis’s

ambiguities and silences for what they were and were, indeed, intended to be, we

must number Father John Courtney Murray, S.J. Murray’s interpretation of Sec. 6,
and in particular his prestigious refusal to respect Dignitatis’s silence on the

question of “establishment,” has influenced many persons’ interpretation of the

document. Murray avers as follows in his commentary in the Abbot edition of the

documents of Vatican II: “This paragraph is carefully phrased. The Council did not
wish to condemn the institution of ‘establishment,’ the notion of a religion of the

state.’ A respectable opinion maintains that the institution is compatible with full

religious freedom.” 31 “On the other hand,” however, Murray continued in the same

breath:

[t]he Council did not wish to canonize the institution. A respectable opinion
holds that establishment is always a threat to religious freedom.

Furthermore, the Council wished to insinuate that establishment, at least

from the Catholic point of view, is a matter of historical circumstance, not of

See the contributions of Brian Harrison in Arnold T. Guminski and Brian W.
Harrison, O.S., Religious Freedom: Did Vatican II Contradict Traditional Catholic
Doctrine? A Debate (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2013).
31 Abbot, The Documents of Vatican II, 685 n.17.
30
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theological doctrine. For all these reasons the text deals with the issue in
conditional terms. 32

Especially given Murray’s somewhat balanced report of Sec. 6’s cultured equipoise
on the issue of establishment, it is astonishing to have to confront the man’s

personal view, expressed elsewhere in the same year (1966), that Dignitatis

withholds all preferential treatment, including any form of establishment, from the
Church. 33 The bottom line is that, flirting with (or violating) the principle of non-

contradiction, Murray held at the same time mutually contradictory positions on
what Dignitatis accomplished, but it was Murray’s personal view, however,

according to which Dignitatis condemned all establishment, that got by far the
greater traction and circulation. The counter-Magisterium at work.

The Murray-encouraged myth that Dignitatis does work that it deliberately

declined enjoys distinguished defenders, including Judge Noonan himself. On

Noonan’s account, it was the genius of the American constitutional devotion to

“religious freedom” that, through the work of Fr. Murray (and others) at the Second

Vatican Council, carried the day with the Council Fathers and led to Dignitatis. Each
point merits emphasis. First, according to Noonan, “[t]he learning [at the Council]

had been largely from the United States . . . [T]he Declaration on Religious Freedom
would not have come into existence without the American contribution and the

Ibid.
John Courtney Murray, “The Issue of Church and State at Vatican II,” Theological
Studies 27 (1966), reprinted in Religious Liberty: Catholic Struggles with Pluralism,
ed. J. Leon Hooper (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), 207, 212,
210.
32
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experiment that began with Madison.” 34 Second, according to Noonan, “[l]ike

religion itself free exercise is culture-bound. Yet there is a direction in which the
nations have moved. The American experience has lighted up the skies.” 35

We can agree with Noonan that the United States constitutional order has

done a fabled job of protecting individual religious freedom through law; that

juridical accomplishment has been, in Noonan’s view, “the lustre of our country” (a

phrase he borrows from James Madison). 36 But there is also the competing fact that
our culture and constitutional jurisprudence have not done a correspondingly good
job -- not by a long shot -- of honoring the liberty of the Church, libertas Ecclesiae,

through law. It is illustrative that the libertas Ecclesiae, on which Dignitatis is quite

loquacious (as we shall see), does not so much as surface in Noonan’s book The
Lustre of Our Country. This omission inexorably means that the question of

“religion” was settled in Noonan’s analysis, at least by way of exposition, without

reference to the very purpose of creation. How can such an occlusion “light[] up the
skies”?, one might reasonably ask. It is no exaggeration to say that, on Noonan’s

telling, the constitutional order of the United States is commended without regard to
its capacity or its incapacity to facilitate the life of the mystical body of Christ and of
the incorporation of individuals into the life of His mystical body.

If Noonan is correct concerning the commitments deployed in our

constitutional order, there should be no surprise over the Obama Administration’s

current crusade to compel the Church to violate the moral law as a condition of her
34
35
36

Id. at 353
Id. at 9.
Id. at 4.
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continuing to perform her corporal and corporate works of mercy and justice. If we
were to coin a phrase to parallel Madison’s as echoed by Noonan, we might call this

“the indictment of our country.” 37 After all, the Church is no essential component --

only an accidental, incidental, and contingent component – of the skies Noonan

considered “lighted up.” The constitutional reduction of the matter of religion, a

matter of divine justice, to individuals’ claimed rights to “religious freedom,”

reduces the rights of the Church to rubble in need of resuscitation, on a good day.

This evisceration should trouble Catholics to their core.

V.

The adequate alternative to this injustice would consist, in the first place, of

giving the Church what is hers by divine right, as Dignitatis itself teaches. Dignitatis,

having affirmed that “the traditional Catholic doctrine on the moral duty of men and
societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church of Christ” remains
intact, re-states the core of that doctrine as follows:

Among the things that concern the good of the Church and indeed the welfare

of society here on earth-things therefore that are always and everywhere to

Having criticized Noonan’s The Lustre of Our Country for following Murray’s
personal thesis on the libertas Ecclesiae that the text of Dignitatis does not, I think,
support, fairness and great respect require me to add that I was honored to work as
a research assistant on parts of that book and later reviewed the book in very
favorable terms. I will take this occasion to regret my own slowness to appreciate
the priority of the libertas Ecclesiae, while at the same time reiterating my debt to
Judge Noonan for his edifying insistence that the Catholic Church must never compel
non-Catholics to become Catholic.
37
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be kept secure and defended against all injury-this certainly is preeminent,

namely, that the Church should enjoy that full measure of freedom which her
care for the salvation of men requires. This is a sacred freedom, because the

only-begotten Son endowed with it the Church which He purchased with His
blood. Indeed it is so much the property of the Church that to act against it is
to act against the will of God. The freedom of the Church is the fundamental
principle in what concerns the relations between the Church and
governments and the whole civil order. 38

What exactly the libertas Ecclesiae consists in remains to be stated, and Dignitatis

itself does indeed speak to this very issue, though with a critical omission to which I

shall come toward the end. Whatever the details, however, it is undeniable that

Dignitatis privileges that principle’s significance and scope: “Libertas Ecclesiae est

principium fundamentale in relationibus inter Ecclesiam et potestates publicas

totumque ordinem civilem.” Dignitatis thus teaches, consistently with the whole of

Catholic tradition, that specification of what is the Church’s by right does not await
definition or concession by the civil ruling authority but instead precedes it as

“principium fundamentale.” This freedom is “sacred” (“libertas sacra est”) because it
is endowed by Christ. “The Church’s ‘sacred liberty’ stems from divine mandate
directly, rather than via secondary causality. . . . [It] cannot be unseated by

38
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considerations of ‘prudence,’ whether those considerations be introduced by the
Church or by the state,” 39 not even by “Framers” or the Obama Administration.

The liberty of the Church comes first. As Dignitatis reaffirms, the freedom of

the Church is “principium fundamentale” that all must honor. The liberty of the
Church, not individual “religious freedom is the fundamental principle in

determining relations between the Church and the civil authorities. If the liberty of
the Church is to be honored, however, that liberty “must be established

[“sancienda”] in the juridical order,” to quote the words of Dignitatis itself. 40

Without such freedom fixed firmly in law, Christians cannot but drift -- or be driven
-- into diaspora. What is at stake is the life of the Mystical Body of Christ, not just
the vibrancy of scouting.

James Madison, one of the heroes of Noonan’s book, knows nothing of the

liberty of the Church; individual conscience is as much as he knows. Fr. Murray,

another of the book’s heroes, knows both, of course. As Frederick Lawrence has
written, “Murray’s thought on politics is colored by the unfolding tradition of
Christian constitutionalism in virtue of the historical mediation – at once

theological, ethical, political, juridical, and jurisprudential – of the principle of the
two swords and the principle of libertas ecclesiae.” 41 In We Hold These Truths,

Murray explained that “the whole patristic and medieval tradition, which Leo XIII

Hittinger, First Grace, 233.
Dignitatis, No. 13: “Concordia igitur viget inter libertatem Ecclesiae et libertatem
illam religiosam, quae omnibus hominibus et communitatibus est tanquam ius
agnoscenda et in ordinatione iuridica sancienda.”
41 Frederick G. Lawrence, “John Courtney Murray and Political Theology as
Conversational,” in J. Leon Hooper, S.J., and Todd David Whitmore (eds), John
Courtney Murray and the Growth of Tradition (Kansas City, MO: Sheed and Ward,
1996), 41, 44.
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reiterated to the modern world, asserts the freedom of the Church to be a

participation in the Incarnate Son of God, the God-Man, Christ Jesus. . . . I should

perhaps emphasize,” Murray continued, “that the phrase [libertas Ecclesiae] should
be given its full meaning. . . . What appeared within history was not an ‘idea’ or an

‘essence’ but an existence, a Thing, a visible institution that occupied ground in this
world at the same time that it asserted an astounding new freedom on a title not of
this world.” Murray is acutely aware that the world did not spontaneously

acquiesce in what the Church claimed for herself and accede to the limit she placed
on the state:

Through the centuries a new tradition of politics was wrought out very
largely in the course of the wrestlings between the new freedom of the

Church and the pretensions of an older power which kept discovering, to its
frequent chagrin, that it was not the one unchallengeable ruler of the world
and that its rule was not unlimitedly free. 42

Would that such “discovering” were the end of the story, but Murray himself was

also acutely aware that the next phase of the long arc of salvation history involved a

root and branch rejection of what had gradually been discovered as the implications
of the libertas Ecclesiae.

In the period Murray was describing in the language quoted above, “[t]he

freedom of the Church, in its pregnant meaning, was conceived to be the key to the
John Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths : Catholic Reflections on the
American Proposition (Kansas City, MO: Sheed and Ward, 1960), 202, 204.
42
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Christian order of society.” 43 It is customary and convenient to describe the

organizing principle of the Christian order of society as the “Gelasian dyarchy,” a
reference to Pope Gelasius I’s declaration to the Emperor Anastasius:

There are two powers, august Emperor, by which this world is chiefly

ruled, namely, the sacred authority of the priests and the royal power.
Of these that of the priests is the more weighty, since they have to

render an account for even the kings of men in the divine judgment.

You are also aware, dear son, that while you are permitted honorably
to rule over human kind, yet in things divine you bow your head

humbly before the leaders of the clergy and await from their hands

the means of your salvation. In the reception and proper disposition
of the heavenly mysteries you recognize that you should be

subordinate rather than superior to the religious order, and that in

these matters you depend on their judgment rather than wish to force
them to follow your will. 44

According to Murray, the defining feature of what he refers to as “modern politics” 45
was the rejection of the theorem of the Gelasian dyarchy. “The freedom of the
Church, again in its pregnant sense, was discarded as the mediating principle

between society and state . . . . Instead, a secular substitute was adopted in the form
Id. at 205.
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/gelasius1.asp
45 Murray, We Hold These Truths, 205.
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of free political institutions. Through these secular institutions the people would
limit the power of government.” 46 The Church herself was supplanted in favor of
the contingent deliveries of individual conscience. This is the regime Murray

defends, the one Noonan celebrates as having been baptized by Dignitatis. “The key
to the whole new political edifice,” Murray explains, “was the freedom of the

individual conscience. Here precisely lies the newness of the modern experiment. . .
. The only sovereign spiritual authority would be the conscience of the free man.”

Murray is unstinting in his description of the revolution wrought by the politics of
modernity:

The freedom of the individual conscience, constitutionally guaranteed, would
supply the armature of immunity to the sacred order, which now became, by
modern definition, precisely the order of private conscience. And through
free political institutions, again constitutionally guaranteed, the moral

consensus of the community would be mobilized in favor of justice and
freedom in the secular order. 47

Such was the promise of a political order out of which had been wrung the libertas
Ecclesiae. And it required, as Murray notes, “a great act of trust.” 48 But, one might

reasonably ask, why trust the consciences of the neighbors more than the Church?

46
47
48

Id. at 206
Id. at 206.
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Murray did not live long enough to write his own variation on the

disillusionment and disappointment Jacques Maritain poured out in The Peasant of
the Garonne, and so we can only speculate about what Murray’s judgment would

have been concerning how the intended fruits of the “great act of trust” are working

out. One can marshal passages from We Hold These Truths that reveal commendable
if inchoate anxiety on Murray’s part about whether post-modern man and his

conscience – and that would be us! -- can make the experiment work. But even after
the Council, as I mentioned above, Murray was keen to renounce what Dignitatis

itself refused to renounce: all juridical privileges for the Church.

Murray had his reasons, of a sort, and they are dominant today. Murray was

inebriated with a politico-theoretical naivette that plagues Anglo-Americans

descended intellectually from Thomas Hobbes and his “mortal God” Leviathan. A

sober assessment of the contemporary situation requires acknowledging, as a first

step, that Murray did not adequately reckon with the consequences of the extent to

which Anglo-American liberalism breaks with the classical tradition of natural right

and natural law. “Murray never acknowledged that Locke did not basically disagree
with Hobbes’s ‘artificial law of nature.’ He did not recover,” as Lawrence explains,
“virtue instead of power as the publicly relevant chief concern of political theory.

Instead he moderated Hobbes’s bottom line of self-preservation into comfortable
self-preservation.” 49 The result, as Lawrence goes on to explain, is that

49

Lawrence, “John Courtney Murray,” 49.
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[t]he common good and values not able to be ‘costed out’ get eliminated from
the sphere of public discourse and public opinion. This de facto privatization
of Christian values may just be left obscured, albeit unintentionally, by
Murray’s famous distinction between public order as the domain of

legitimately exercised political power and the common good as the domain of
public consensus and of social concern beyond the limits of public order. 50

We will return to that distinction below. The present point is that liberalism of the

sort Murray asked us to “trust” systemically eliminates higher goals from politics in
order to secure enough agreement to live peacefully together. More specifically,

though Lawrence does not make the point explicitly, the liberal constitutional order
descended from Locke denies the libertas Ecclesiae, the right of the Church, for

example, to teach such illiberal ideas as the primacy of the common good, indeed of

the supernatural common good and, moreover, to declare laws in conflict with those
goods to be void. The U.S. Constitution simply does not acknowledge the divine
right, let alone honor it.

Even as we limp along under a Lockean constitutional order, however,

Christians know that God calls individuals and societies to a life richer than even an

abundance of bourgeoise Lockeanism. In this light, the question to which I would
now like to turn is the one with which Fred Lawrence concluded his study of

“Murray and the Ambiguities of Liberalism:” “Is the correction and sublation of
liberal constitutionalism by Christian constitutionalism, in a way that Murray
50

Id. at 50.
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initiated but was unable to finish during his lifetime, possible?” Or, to vary the

question slightly, is Christian constitutionalism possible anymore? And in what
would it consist?
VI.
The articulation and implementation of the libertas Ecclesiae do not occur

except in lived history, of course, and the study of history discloses that the position
of the Church in the world has varied by time and place. Some configurations are
better than others, but Dignitatis leaves no doubt but that all must be judged

according to that “principium fundamentale” that is sacra libertas Ecclesiae. To

repeat: the contingent constitution of the state must be in conformity with the given
constitution of the Church, not the other way around.

But what, then, about individuals and their rights? For nearly fifty years now,

Dignitatis has been praised for being the Church’s conversion to the “religious

freedom” of individuals. In point of fact, however, the traditional Catholic view

authoritatively taught the following three pro-individual-freedom principles:
1. No one must be forced to act against his conscience in private.
2. No one must be forced to act against his conscience in public.

3. No one must be forced to act against his conscience in public or in private,
but may be forced to act against his conscience when the matter involves
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a violation of the natural law and civil authorities determine that it would
be in the interest of the common good to do so. 51

These traditional principles represent the authoritative teaching of the Church, even
if, alas, they were not always honored in practice.

The celebrated achievement of Dignitatis was to add a fourth principle to this

list of three, and this addition is what earlier Popes had understood to amount to
“deliramentum,” madness:

4. No one may be prevented from acting in accordance with his conscience
in public, provided the “public order” is not violated. 52

It is undisputed that the phrase “public order” that made its way into the text of

Dignitatis was intended by Murray and others to encompass less than the scope of

the common good as it was traditionally understood, 53 but the Catechism of the
Catholic Church revisited the question and taught instead that

[t]he right to religious liberty can of itself be neither unlimited nor limited

only by a “public order” conceived in a positivist or naturalist manner. The
“due limits” which are inherent in it must be determined for each social

See Davies, The Second Vatican Council, 210-31.
My account of these four principles varies that provided in Davies, The Second
Vatican Council, 210-31.
53 Id at 156-58.
51
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situation by political prudence, according to the requirements of the common
good . . . . 54

In support of this gloss on Dignitatis, the Catechism cites Pius VI, Quod aliquantum

(1791) and Pius IX, Quanta cura (1864). The continuity with the previous teaching

is evident because demonstrated.

This affirmation of the civil ruling authority’s ordination to the common

good, not merely to an emaciated “public order,” even in the face of individuals’

conflicting claims to act according to conscience in public, should serve to focus our
attention on the true connection between the liberty of the Church and the

constitution of the state. On the one hand, the focal role of the civil ruling authority
is to ordain the commonwealth to the temporal common good but also, as Blessed

John XXIII made clear in his celebrated encyclical letter Pacem in terries (1963), to
the supernatural common good:

In this connection, We would draw the attention of Our own sons to the fact
that the common good is something which affects the needs of the whole

man, body and soul. That, then, is the sort of good which rulers of States must
take suitable measure to ensure. They must respect the hierarchy of values,
and aim at achieving the spiritual as well as the material prosperity of their
subjects. 55

Catechism of the Catholic Church, sec. 2109
Blessed John XXIII, encyclical letter Pacem in terris (1963) No. 57 (citing Pope
Pius XII, encyclical letter Summi pontificatus (1939)).
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Dignitatis carefully refused to endorse state neutrality with respect to religion;

instead, as Russell Hittinger’s exegsis of Dignitatis demonstrates, “[g]overnment

should actively promote, not usurp, religious acts.” 56

On the other hand, it is the work of the Church to ordain humanity to the

supernatural common good, including sometimes by directing the terms of the

temporal common good. No one has improved on Pope Leo XIII’s statement of the
architectonic structure of the relationship between Church and state:

The Almighty, therefore, has given the charge of the human race to two

powers, the ecclesiastical and the civil, the one being set over divine, and the
other over human, things. Each in its kind is supreme, each has fixed limits
within which it is contained, limits which are defined by the nature and

special object of the province of each, so that there is, we may say, an orbit
traced out within which the action of each is brought into play by its own

native right. But, inasmuch as each of these two powers has authority over

the same subjects, and as it might come to pass that one and the same thingrelated differently, but still remaining one and the same thing-might belong

to the jurisdiction and determination of both, therefore God, who foresees all

things, and who is the author of these two powers, has marked out the course
of each in right correlation to the other. 57
56
57

Hittinger, First Grace, 230.
Pope Leo XIII, encyclical letter Immortale Dei (1885) No. 13.
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According to Leo later in the same encyclical, “[t]his is the teaching of the Catholic

Church concerning the constitution and government of the State,” 58 and it was this
teaching, in turn, that Dignitatis deliberately left “untouched.”

While Church and state each has its own sphere in which to work and govern,

it bears emphasis that, pace modern political theory that seeks to legitimate all

social structures exclusively on the ground of democratic pedigree, neither Church

nor state performs its function on its own authority. Church and state are the same
in having what authority they have only from Christ. The Church enjoys her

authority directly by Christological establishment and the state possesses its own
authority via designation by the people, but that difference in causality does not
alter the fundamental fact that neither Church nor state stands on its own

authoritative bottom. To be precise, the ruling authority of the state and the ruling

authority of the Church are of a piece in this, viz., that they are participations in the

Kingship of Christ.
VII.

With this, then, we come to what I regard as the key to reversing the hopeless

and ultimately pointless march in favor of “religious freedom”: the social Kingship
of Christ. This is a doctrine of which one hears precious little since the Council; in
fact, the conciliar and post-conciliar conspiracy of silence about the Kingship of
Christ is deeply related to the Council’s preference for a state that is limited to
58

Immortale Dei, No. 36
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preserving mere “public order.” Such a state could hardly be said to be a proper

participant in the Kingship of Christ, for Christ ordains to the common good, not just
to détente. Allowed and indeed obligated to ordain to the common good, however,
as the Catechism teaches explicitly, the state manifests its participation in the regal
munus of Christ.

Authoritatively taught by the Church for centuries, the doctrine of the social

kingship of Christ was beautifully recapitulated by Pope Pius XI in his encyclical

Quas Primas (1925) and, moreover, introduced into the lex orandi of the Church in a

new Mass and Office for the last Sunday in October (in order immediately to precede
the Feast of All Saints on November 1). While the Second Vatican Council was

scandalously silent on the topic, on this doctrine, too, the Catechism of the Catholic
Church refused to offer silence: “Christians are called to be the light of the world.
Thus, the Church shows forth the kingship of Christ over all creation and in

particular over human societies.” In support of this the Catechism cites Apostolicam

actuositatem, the Council’s Decree on the Laity (1965), Pope Leo XIII’s Immortale Dei

(1885), and Pope Pius XI’s Quas primas (1925). The citation to Apostolicam

actuositatem would seem to be amiss because the text there says nothing in terms
about the Kingship of Christ, but the citations to Immortale Dei and Quas primas
transmit the traditional teaching concerning Christ’s social kingship.

Dignitatis, as I emphasized above, having declared that it left untouched

traditional Catholic teaching on the duty of individuals and societies toward the one
true religion and the Catholic Church, went on to declare that the “principium

fundamentale” governing all relations between the Church and public authorities
34

and the whole civil order is the libertas Ecclesiae. To the extent that that proposition
is true, however, it is so only if it be interpreted in light of traditional Catholic social
teaching on which Dignitatis and the Council – but not the Catechism -- are

regrettably silent, viz., the social Kingship of Christ. In language I quoted above,

Murray aptly singled the Church out as a unique participation in the Incarnate Jesus.
What Murray neglected to mention is the Church’s participation – not to mention

the state’s different participation – in specifically the kingship, the royal munus, of

the one Christ. If we speak more precisely and more fully than Dignitatis does, we
must say that

[f]reedom is not the fundamental principle, nor a fundamental principle in
the matter. The public law of the Church is founded on the States duty to
recognize the social royalty of Our Lord Jesus Christ! The fundamental

principle which governs the relations between Church and State is the “He
must reign” of St. Paul, Oportet illum regnare (I Cor. 15:25) – the reign that
applies not only to the Church but must be the foundation of the temporal
City. 59

VIII.

59

Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre, quoted in Davies, The Second Vatican Council, 181.
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In sum, although Dignitatis leaves untouched “traditional doctrine on the

moral duty of men and societies toward the true religion and toward the one Church
of Christ,” the Declaration pregnantly and defiantly refuses to affirm the moral duty

of societies toward Christ the King. This is, at best, a tension. It is little wonder,

then, that in his message addressed to political rulers at the close of the Council, on
December 8, 1965, Pope Paul VI could say this:

What does the Church ask of you today? In one of the major texts of the

Council she has told you: she asks of you nothing but freedom – the freedom

to believe and to preach her faith, the freedom to love God and to serve Him,
the freedom to live and to bring to men her message of life. 60

Commenting on this astonishing statement by the Sovereign Pontiff, Murray
concluded:

This doctrine is traditional; it is also new. Implicit in it is the renunciation by
the Church of a condition of legal privilege in society. The Church does not
make, as a matter of right or of divine law, the claim that she should be

established as the “religion of the state”. Her claim is freedom, nothing
more. 61

60
61

Abbott, The Documents of Vatican II, 693.
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The absurd consequences that follow from the “nothing more than freedom”

position are on full display in Michael Novak’s novel social charter, to take one
prominent example, in which “genuine” pluralism magically becomes the
grundnorm:

In a genuine pluralistic society, there is no one sacred canopy. By intention

there is not. At its spiritual core, there is an empty shrine. That shrine is left
empty in the knowledge that no one word, image, or symbol is worthy of

what all seek there. Its emptiness, therefore, represents the transcendence

which is approached by free consciences from a virtually infinite number of
directions. . . . Such an order calls forth not only a new theology but a new
type of religion. 62

I shall content myself with, first, the observation that Novak advocates “a new type

of religion” on the ground that Christ is “unworthy” of what all seek and, second, the
following question: Of whom is Christ unworthy? At Mass, Catholics pray (echoing

the centurion of Matthew 8:8): “Domine, non sum dignus, ut intres sub tectum meum,
sed tantum dic verbo, et sanabitur anima mea.” Novak has the order of reality
backwards.

Mere freedom, with its empty shrine and new type of religion, is a false start

and a dead end. As Pope Leo XIII stated in Immortale Dei, “there was a time when

Michael Novak, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (London: IEA, 1982, 1991),
53, 69.
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states were ruled according the philosophy of the Gospels,” 63 and that was not, one

might add, because states merely acknowledged the Church’s freedom but, instead,
because states honored the demands of Christ’s social kingship as taught by the

Church. The shrine was not empty and the only true religion was practiced by most
in those states. The true common good demands no less.

Today, however, the U.S. Bishops oppose the contraceptive mandate solely

on the stated ground that it violates the religious freedom of the Catholic Church,
and Catholics galore are champing at the bit to reassure everyone who will listen
that Catholic opposition to the mandate has nothing whatsoever to do with the

moral law and contraception per se. This is all wrong, in my view, because the logic

of such “it’s not about the moral law” arguments leads, at best, to a Church hunkered

down in a bunker, left alone by and, in turn, leaving alone the world it no longer seeks
to correct and transform according to the principles of the Gospel and – we must not
overlook it – by the grace of the sacraments. Today, many self-styled liberals and
neo-conservatives alike thrill to accuse the Church in the nineteenth century of

being a “fortress” Church. Today, however, Timothy Cardinal Dolan protests only
that the contraceptive mandate represents “government intrusion in the internal
governance of religious institutions...” and violates “our standard for respecting
religious liberty.” 64 In doing so, he ironically and unwittingly defends what

amounts to a fortress Church for the twenty-first century, one within which Catholics
will be permitted by legal accommodation to hide themselves from the evil that is

Pope Leo XIII, Immortale Dei, No. 12.
See Patrick McKinley Brennan, “‘Religious Freedom,’ The Individual Mandate and
Gifts: On Why the Church is Not a Bomb Shelter,” 58 Villanova Law Review 437, 45052 (2013).
63
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corrupting the rest of the world about which it no longer cares enough to give a

damn. Will this evil receive no resistance from the Church Militant? Must not Christ
reign?

Speaking in Milan on June 2, 2012, Pope Benedict stated that “to the extent

that the concept of a confessional State is out of date, it seems in any case clear that
its laws must find justification and force in natural law, which is the basis of an

order in conformity with the dignity of the human person, surmounting a merely
positivist understanding from which no ethical indication of any kind can be

derived.” 65 This is the interpretation Fr. Ratzinger gave to Dignitatis but later--

though only temporarily, it would seem -- repudiated. It refuses on principle to

aspire to a Christian constitutionalism, a state that honors its social obligations to

Christ the King. It was a consistent theme of Pope Benedict’s pontificate that those
who are responsible for advancing the work of the state through its laws must look

beyond the mere facts about what has been posited as “law.” They must look, Pope
Benedict taught, to the natural law or (as he liked to call them) “Christian values.”

But must they not also look to Christianity itself and, indeed, to Christ, to Christ-

continued-in-the world, the Church? First, the Church enjoys an ontological reality

that involves rights, not just privileges. Second, Christ demands the social worship

of a Catholic state, not just people’s implementation of some humanizing and
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civilizing “values” He seems to have inspired. 66 Third, the Church knows infinitely
more reliably than the neighbors what the moral law requires.

Murray remitted our collective future and our individual futures to the “great

act of trust” in a world of individual consciences perhaps formed according to
natural law and natural right. This amounts to a hopeless refusal to allow the

Church to function as is her right -- and as the world and souls need. The truly free

Church will use her freedom and grace to break down the grand coalition in favor of
the status quo, will wake souls from “Newton’s Sleep,” 67 and will correct and

transform the world in the light of the New Law of the Gospel: the Church will

“direct[] Christian service to human society to bring about the kingdom of God.” 68

Those Catholics who are up to this task, unlike so many self-describing Catholic

liberals and neo-conservatives today, will apprehend the place of the supernatural
in the “collaboration in fulfilling the redemptive and constructive roles of the

Christian church in human society.” 69 Eager to perform the divinely commanded
work of transformative service, the Church militant will not hunker down in a

fortress, but instead will work through the organs of the Mystical Body of Christ for

the correction and uplifting of all of society and culture, including through the

On Christ’s demand for the social worship of a Catholic state, see Alfredo
Cardinal Ottaviani, Duties of the Catholic State: Justice and Reason Forbid the State to
be Godless (Kansas City, MO: Angelus Press, 2009). Original edition 1954.
67 I allude not so much to William Blake as to Joseph Vining, whose work in law
offers a way out of the secularist cage that everywhere offers to imprison us. See
Patrick McKinley Brennan, H. Jefferson Powell, and Jack L. Sammons (eds.), Legal
Affinities: Explorations in the Legal Form of Thought (Durham, NC: Carolina
Academic Press, 2013), a study of Vining’s work. On the importance of Vining’s
work for waking us up, see also Steven D. Smith, The Disenchantment of Secular
Discourse (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 40.
68 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 362.
69 Id. at 368.
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constitutional and juridical order, even though its completion will not be achieved in
a day.

The hour is overdue for men and women to awake from the dogmatic

slumbers imposed by the grand coalition in favor of the status quo and recognize
that the “empty shrine” enshrined by the U.S Constitution leads to a dead end, a

tomb. Creation was for the sake of the Church, Christ-continued-in-the-world -- not

for the sake of “religious freedom.” Christ is not optional. “Oportet illum regnare” (1

Cor. 15:25).
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